Philip Guthrie Hoffman Hall 405, 11:00 AM.

Electoral Competition amid Violence: Evidence from Colombia.

What is the impact of political violence on electoral competition?  This paper explores whether and how violent activity of insurgent groups affects the electoral process, particularly the willingness of politicians to compete and citizens to vote. I focus on the case of Colombia where elections occur in the middle of an asymmetric and lengthy timeline combination of ballots and bullets. The analysis encompasses four local electoral cycles for mayoral and municipal council offices (1997, 2000, 2003, and 2007) in more than 1,000 municipalities. This work will argue that in contentious scenarios, political competition varies not only with the extent of violence, but also with the type of violent actor (pro-state/anti-state armed insurgency), and its territorial balance of military power. It will also argue that these effects will be contingent upon institutional variables such as the district magnitude. Overall, my findings suggest that anti-regime insurgencies deflate overall competition whereas those closer to the state (such as the paramilitary) boost competition of political allies.