Philip Guthrie Hoffman Hall 405, 11:00 AM.
Presidents vs. Congress and the Constitutional Court: An Empirical Analysis of the Veto Power in Colombia, 1998- 2012
As in other Latin American presidential regimes, Colombian legislators hold ample power to amend bills and due to the simple majority requirement for overrides, could potentially be successful in having their preferences translated into legislation. This institutional design is intended to promote compromise among branches, giving Congress more power than usually assumed when analyzing the veto power of Latin American presidents. Nonetheless, and to our knowledge, previous empirical and theoretical analyses do not consider the inclusion of yet another player: The Constitutional Court. In the case of Colombia, its role is fundamental as it becomes the last player after the president vetoes a bill claiming it is unconstitutional. With an originally constructed dataset of all bills debated and passed by the Colombian Congress covering the last four presidential periods, the objective of this paper is to analyze the political circumstances in which presidents are more likely to veto a bill, what are the characteristics of bills that are vetoed (i.e., policy benefits) and finally, how legislators and the President adapt to the Court’s rulings related to presidential vetoes. To accomplish this, we coded all vetoed bills by article, showing 1) that the policy benefits are a determining factor both for the President to veto and for Congress to override, 2) that the arguments used to veto the same type of legislation (or parts of it) change as the Court reconsiders what is and is not constitutional.
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